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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                    Plaintiff,
                                       ) No. 05-60008-2-HO
5
                                        ) February 16, 2010
       v.
     PIROUZ SEDAGHATY, et al.,
6
                                       ) Eugene, Oregon
7
                     Defendants.
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                    TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT
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              BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. HOGAN
                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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                     Deborah Wilhelm, CSR, RPR
                          Court Reporter
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(Tuesday, February 16, 2010; 11:54 a.m.)
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                      PROCEEDINGS
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             THE CLERK: Now is the time set for the matter
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    of United States of America versus Pirouz Sedaghaty,
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    Case No. 05-60008, time set for oral argument on motion
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    247 to compel, motion 251 to compel, and motion 253 to
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    compel.
             Mr. Cardani, at counsel table you have
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    Mr. Gorder with you and also you have Ms. Anderson; is
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    that correct?
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             MR. CARDANI: Yes.
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             THE CLERK: Thank you.
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             And, Mr. Bons, you are appearing on behalf of
    the bank?
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             MR. BONS: I am, Your Honor.
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             THE CLERK: And I have Bruce (sic) Green at
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    counsel table with you, as well as -- may I have your
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    name?
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             MS. HAVEL: Mia Havel, M-I-A, H-A-V-E-L.
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             MR. BONS: I just want to make sure I didn't
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    misunderstand you, Boaz Green for the bank also, Boaz.
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             THE CLERK: Yes.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Wax, we'll take your motion
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    first. Let me just -- of course I'm familiar with the
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    subject matter from the previous motion and so on. And
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the fact is, of course, that there is no Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Saudi Arabia, so that's kind of a moot question. And I'm considering a limited issuance of letters rogatory, but not one that will impact the trial schedule, just so that you know. So at least you know what to dissuade me of, if you can use a rifle instead of a shotgun. All right. If you have some more about this, great.

MR. WAX: On Friday we filed a motion for reconsideration of the Egyptian request. And this morning we were able to obtain a declaration from the Attorney Boss who was the attorney in the El Hindi matter. That should have been filed electronically around 8:00 or 8:30 this morning. I think that informs that portion of your decision in the Egyptian matter and should inform your decision in the Saudi matter with respect to the dispute that apparently exists between the United States and Mr. Sedaghaty about the utilization of the MLAT procedure by the government for defense counsel in other cases.

When we argued previously, the government had represented to the court that they did not believe that it had occurred. In your opinion you indicated in a footnote that you did not believe that it had been utilized. Mr. Boss's declaration, as we see it, makes

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clear that the government did proceed with the MLAT.

And the absence of any evidence in that case was the result of the receiving country's failure to respond rather than the United States government's unwillingness to utilize the process.

On Friday, we also sent the government a letter and attachments that included a number of other documents that we're interested in obtaining from Saudi Arabia. We suggested to them that it might make more sense to deal with the Saudi documents with a conversation between us first.

We certainly would be happy for the court, if you are inclined, to issue the letter rogatory with respect to the documents we had identified or with respect to our request for the interview of Sami Al-Sanad. I do want to make you aware that there are other documents, we hope to have a discussion with the government about them.

We also have been looking at the procedures in 18 U.S.C. 3491 et seq., which call for utilization of U.S. consular officials in order to deal with the authentication aspects of documents. So that's what we have to say about those issues today.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GORDER: Your Honor, Charles Gorder for the

United States. First, turning to the matter involving your previous order regarding Egypt. As you know,

Mr. Wax's filing was late Friday afternoon, and over the three-day weekend, we have not had a chance to confirm or find out exactly what the facts are with regard to this question of whether an MLAT was ever sent to Egypt in the El Hindi case.

The people we have talked to this morning don't believe that there was, but there is one person that we were unable -- or they were unable to find before we came to court. And so what we would ask is the time to properly respond to that issue.

With regard to the defendant's motion for a letter rogatory to Saudi Arabia, I don't want to repeat everything that is in our briefing, but we do not believe that there is a sufficient basis to have a letter rogatory for any of the four documents that Mr. Wax proffered in his motion.

We really question both the relevance and, to some extent, the authenticity of several of those documents.

THE COURT: I may agree with that, but here is,
I think, the way to do this is for Mr. Wax to send us
both what he would like the letter to say, let him do
the drafting, in other words, while we deal with the

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    bank robber cases and so on; then you respond on a form
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    you think is appropriate. I'd just like it to happen
    quickly, because we do have a June trial date here. And
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    I have my jaw pretty much set on that. Okay?
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             MR. GORDER: Okay. With regard to Mr. Sanad,
    as we indicated, we don't have any objection to an
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    invitation for him to come testify, but we think that
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    just the limited letter rogatory, at best, would be
    sufficient to find out if he's willing to provide any
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    kind of statement.
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             And as the court -- you are familiar, I assume,
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    with the briefing in the matter involving the bank, I
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    seriously doubt we'll get a response.
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             THE COURT: In 37 years, one I haven't had yet
    so it's always nice to get something new.
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             And how much time do you want to respond on the
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    previous order on the matter that Mr. Wax talked about?
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             MR. GORDER: A week, Your Honor, would be fine.
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             THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. Well, great.
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    So why don't you a submit a form of letter rogatory that
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    you'd like me to sign.
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             MR. WAX: I believe that we had done that, Your
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    Honor, as an attachment to the motion.
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             THE COURT: If you did, I didn't read it. But
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    if we have it, great.
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MR. WAX: I will double check that, but I
    believe that we included as Exhibit A to the pleading
    the actual letter rogatory itself in the form that we
    understood would be appropriate.
             THE COURT: All right. So I'd like your
    response in a week on that also.
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             MR. GORDER: Very well.
             THE COURT: Let's go to the bank matter.
             MR. WAX: Your Honor, when you are done with
    the bank, there are a couple of other brief issues that
    I hope we can return to.
             MR. GORDER: Your Honor, Charles Gorder again
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    for the United States. Since we filed our reply brief
    last week, we learned that Judge Huvelle in the District
    of Columbia has granted the government's motion to stay
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    the proceeding that the bank filed in the District of
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    Columbia. That actually occurred last Tuesday. Because
    of the snow issues in D.C., we didn't find out about it
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    until Friday afternoon.
             THE COURT: I received the language on that.
    It was a clean punt.
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             MR. GORDER: Right, the ball is in your court.
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             THE COURT: I understand, I understand exactly
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    what she did. They have a great lunch room there for
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    the judges, by the way. And I'll point it out to her
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next time I'm there.

MR. GORDER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your
Honor, this is a matter of first impression, so I would
like to spend a little time talking about the history of
5318(k) of Title 31. It was added as part of Title III
of the PATRIOT Act that was passed shortly after 9/11.
And Congress was very specific in its findings and its
purpose in passing this statute. It specifically found
in Section 302 of the PATRIOT Act -- and I'm
paraphrasing -- that jurisdictions outside the United
States provide essential tools to disguise the
ownership, movement of criminal funds used to commit,
among other things, terrorism. And that correspondent
banking facilities are susceptible to the manipulation
that would permit the laundering of those kinds of
funds.

And the purpose of the actual title was to increase the strength of U.S. measures to prevent, detect, and, I emphasize, prosecute the financing of terrorism. So we submit the Congress knew exactly what it was doing when it passed this statute.

It set up a regime where the Department of

Justice could issue an administrative subpoena, and

require all banks that have a U.S. presence through the

correspondent banks to have a registered agent in the

United States to accept service of the subpoena. And it expected that bank -- foreign banks would be in the dilemma that Al Rajhi claims that they are in today when it passed this statute.

Let me give you just also a little background concerning the government's attempts to not use this process. This is the kind of process that we only use when we do not receive the kinds of cooperation in law enforcement matters that we would expect from our international partners and nations.

In July of 2008, the government made, through the Department of Justice, a formal request to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for exactly what we're asking for in this administrative subpoena. It was grounded in the U.N. convention, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and also the principle of reciprocity, which is obligatory on nations in the world.

And in our judgment and in the judgment of the people at the Department of Justice who do this for a living, because it was obligatory on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we had a much better chance of getting these records rather than going through the letter rogatory process, which is totally discretionary on the court that ultimately receives the letter rogatory.

That formal request was presented to the Kingdom in September of 2008 by the Department of State. And we have received absolutely no response, which is why the Justice Department authorized the U.S. Attorney in the District of Oregon to issue this subpoena last summer in July of 2009.

So the record should be clear that this was not a casual decision on the part of either Mr. Cardani or myself. That this was -- we tried what we thought were the best alternatives to what we call a noncooperative option in a case like this. And we were just simply unsuccessful.

The bank has four arguments to resist enforcement of this subpoena. I'd like to address, I think, in the order of seriousness of their arguments, and it seems to me, at least, that their most serious argument is that they are in this dilemma of being forced to either violate U.S. law or violate Saudi law.

The real dilemma that they find themselves in is to effectively lobby their government to comply with its international obligations or risk losing its corresponding bank privileges in the United States. And the bank's own exhibits, I think, show you that the conundrum of violating Saudi law or violating U.S. law is a false dichotomy.

In Exhibit C in their motion that they filed in D.C., which is incorporated by reference in their response in this court, they set out Section 2.63 of the Saudi anti money laundering rules, which specifically provide for exceptions in cases like this. And I quote, in accordance with Articles 22 and 23 of the Saudi anti money laundering law which allow cooperating with international governmental authorities for cases involving money laundering and terrorist financing, any sharing of information with a foreign party whether with another bank or a foreign governmental authority should not be done without the prior approval and coordination with the Saudi Monetary Agency.

And Article 22 of their money laundering statute says an exception to the confidentiality provisions that normally apply -- as an exception, excuse me, disclosed information by financial institutions could be shared with concerned foreign authorities that are connected with the Kingdom through valid agreements or conventions or on the basis of reciprocity according to defined legal procedures.

Now, the bank, at least in their papers today, have shown that they made no effort to talk to the Saudi Monetary Authority about those international obligations and asking for an exception. So we question, really,

whether the bank actually faces the dilemma that they pose.

But the case law, Your Honor, is clear. Even if there is such a dilemma, the United States' interests in enforcing its own laws outweighs foreign bank secrecy law.

The leading case in this area throughout the country is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in the Bank of Nova Scotia case. There, a grand jury subpoena was served on a domestic bank for records located in the Cayman Islands. Just like here the bank resisted, suggested that maybe you should try a letter rogatory, and asked for permission from a local court in the Cayman Islands to disclose the records, which was refused.

The court -- the Eleventh Circuit rejected the letter rogatory alternative, just as we did because we thought that we had a better way. And the court rejected the dilemma, and said the bank would simply have to choose between two sovereigns, and choose where it decides to do business.

Now, there are numerous cases that have followed that principle, the Bank of Nova Scotia principle, and it's cited in their briefs -- or in our briefs.

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Against all this case law, the bank cites to the In Re Sealed Case in the D.C. Circuit where a court refused to enforce a grand jury subpoena that was served on a bank that was owned by a foreign country for records of a branch located in a second foreign country. The case is unusual in the fact that it doesn't tell us what countries they are, Country X and Country Y.

But that case is distinguishable in several ways from the situation we have here. First, the bank in that case was owned by the foreign country, which I think makes the conflict or the dilemma appear more stark. And the government conceded in that case that it would be a crime in the foreign country, and we don't. We believe that the Saudi government can authorize this very quickly if they just complied with the international obligations that they have agreed to in the U.N. convention.

But, most importantly, Your Honor, the three-judge panel in the *In re Sealed Case* conceded that Congress could empower a court to issue contempt orders in these cases, and it would be the court's duty to enforce them.

And that's exactly what Congress did in this case. This statute is designed to go straight to this dilemma because the fact that your corresponding bank

privileges may be cut off is to prevent the kind of resistance that we see in just this case.

The last case I want to mention, other cases that have dealt with the issue of the conflict between a foreign bank secrecy law and the obligations in the United States sometimes reference the restatement that is quoted in the Ninth Circuit's Richmark case, and I think that one is illustrative, too.

That case actually came out of this district, it came from Judge Frye, where she enforced a discovery order against a Chinese company that was owned by the People's Republic of China seeking net worth information in support of a civil judgment. And there were claims that providing that kind of information would violate the law of the People's Republic of China. And the court looked at, you know, five different issues. And I think they all favor enforcement of the subpoena here.

One is the importance of the document sought.

And I won't belabor the point, but we obviously need, as much as possible, to be able to trace the disposition of the funds that came from Oregon in this case.

The burden of complying with the request, and the bank doesn't even suggest that complying with a subpoena to provide three months' records is any kind of an economic practical burden.

Where the information is located, now the information obviously is located in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but I point out that the reason that we're here is because the owner of the account in Saudi Arabia came to Oregon, collected \$150,000, and took it back and transacted these dollar transactions at the Al Rajhi Bank, which is why we have issued the subpoena we have.

Whether there are alternatives, we've tried them, and they just haven't worked.

But most importantly is what are the national interests involved? And here again, the prevention of terrorism financing is clearly in the United States' national interests. And I'd suggest it's in the interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also. They wouldn't have signed the convention if it weren't. And, in fact, Your Honor, they have actually shut down the al-Haramain Foundation because of terrorism financing. So I think our interests coincide in most ways.

Your Honor, I think the second issue the bank raises is whether or not there is a constitutional problem with the way Congress set up the enforcement of the statute. We've briefed that. I don't want to belabor the point. We are here asking the court to rule on the propriety of the subpoena and enforce it. And the statute sets up a way for a bank to get court

review, a motion to quash, which the bank did. It's here now. And it seems to me that that is all the Fourth Amendment requires of any administrative subpoena, let alone one served on a foreign bank for foreign bank records where there may be much less in the way of Fourth Amendment protections.

The kind of view the court is supposed to make at that point is very limited. Did Congress grant authority to investigate? Have the procedural requirements been met? And whether the evidence is relevant material to the investigation. I don't think the bank seriously challenges the first two categories. They make a halfhearted attempt to challenge the third that says despite the statute's plain wording, it can't be used to obtain evidence post-indictment.

I would note first that there is no time $\label{eq:limitation} \mbox{limitation or proceeding limitation in 5318(k), in the statute.}$

Second, not only -- the statute gives not only the Attorney General the power to issue this kind of subpoena but also the Secretary of the Treasury. And I question -- I mean, the Secretary of the Treasury is not in charge of indicting anyone. So I question whether there is any kind of limitation about indictment -- post-indictment even in the gloss of the statute.

But, finally, the Department of Justice doesn't stop investigating once a case is indicted. We can't use grand jury subpoenas because the grand jury can't act any further once a case is finally indicted. But we do continue to investigate. We do witness interviews. We will issue Rule 17(c) subpoenas or -- to gather evidence. And Congress was presumably aware that we have constantly used DEA administrative subpoenas and health care fraud administrative subpoenas postindictment to collect evidence. Now, there are several cases that have upheld our use of that.

Most importantly, the case of *U.S. versus*Phibbs, a Sixth Circuit case from 1993 that upheld

exactly that. The bank suggests that that was dicta in

that case, but I don't think that's right. There, the

defendant challenged both the basis for the subpoena,

the lack of probable cause, and that's what the court

said there was no standing to address in the particular

case, but it went on to rule that the fact that the

subpoena was used post-indictment was not a problem.

And it's worth noting that the DEA administrative subpoena and the health care fraud administrative subpoena that are referred to in our briefs both refer to the department issuing these in the course of an investigation, and they've been upheld

post-indictment.

Now, opposed to all this, the bank cites the Resolution Trust Company case versus Grant Thornton, again in the D.C. Circuit. Totally different statute, a different agency, and a different purpose for the administrative subpoena. That was an extremely broad mandate that the RTC had, which was to issue administrative subpoenas, quote, for the purpose of carrying out any power, authority, or duty, and was not as narrowly drawn as this particular administrative subpoena statute is. And it was issued solely to discover the financial net worth of a party after a suit was filed.

Now, the case is distinguishable not just because of its -- the fact that it's a different statute and a different agency, the D.C. Circuit read into it a statute of limitations, so to speak, analogizing it to a grand jury subpoena.

My view -- and I guess it's only my view -- but with all due respect to the D.C. Circuit, I don't think the grand jury analogy was apt because, again, after indictment, a grand jury can't do anything. The RTC could still pursue its lawsuit. But the other thing that they suggested was it was a way to get around limits on discovery regarding net worth before judgment.

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So here Congress has specifically given us this method, and we can't use a trial subpoena, Your Honor. We can't use a Rule 17(c) subpoena in this case to obtain these records. So we're not getting around anything. Finally, Your Honor, the bank challenges the scope of the subpoena. This is a very traditional way to -- we're getting some simple bank records, and I frankly don't think that there is anything wrong with that. Unless the court has any questions, we would ask you to issue an order finding that the subpoena was duly authorized and issued under the statute. It's relevant to the issues in this case. Denying the bank's motion to quash. And ordering the bank to comply within 10 days. THE COURT: All right. Let me ask just a clarifying question, I want to make sure specifically what you are asking me to do. Do you draw any distinction between the government seeking to impose a 5318(k) sanction and actual compliance with the subpoena to produce the documents, in other words? MR. GORDER: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. You are seeking both of

those things or just the first?

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             MR. GORDER: No, we are just seeking your order
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    that the bank has to comply, and denying their motion to
    quash. I mean, ultimately it will be up to the Attorney
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    General and the Secretary of the Treasury whether to cut
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    off the corresponding bank privileges.
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             THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Is it
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    Mr. Green?
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             MR. GREEN: Yes, it is, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: How did you get the Internet
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    address "bigreen"?
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             MR. GREEN: I have my parents to thank for
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    that.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. GREEN: The initial matter I want to
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    address is the fact that the bank is not a party to this
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    case. There is not -- there are no allegations of
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    wrongdoing by the bank. The case has been pending for
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    almost five years. And the records requested are almost
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    ten years old. The bank doesn't wish to delay the
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    trial. And it's not trying to deprive the government of
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    the records. It's trying to avoid violating Saudi law
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    in Saudi Arabia and subjecting itself there to criminal
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    prosecution, including imprisonment and fines.
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             The bank is the third largest bank in Saudi
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    Arabia. It has one of the largest net worths of
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domestic branches there. It's publicly traded. It is followed by analysts at the Standards & Poor (sic).

For the bank to be prosecuted in its home country of violating explicit instructions by its regulator not to comply with the request as stated would be a tremendous impact -- would have a tremendous impact on the bank's business and on its reputation. same way, the dilemma of having to lose its correspondent accounts in the United States due to government action would foreclose many lines of businesses that depend on those correspondent accounts and services the bank will no longer be able to provide its customers. And would also cause tremendous reputational harm to the bank. And that could have spillover that we've seen with actions under 5318A, which the government has threatened using against the bank, could also lead to closure of correspondent accounts in other countries as well.

The bank has tried very hard since receiving the subpoena to find a way to comply with the subpoena. It immediately requested authorization by its regulator as required under Section 2.63 that the government has quoted here. It requires preapproval and cooperation of SAMA. And SAMA, Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, refused to provide the bank with the authorization to

provide the records, and stated very explicitly in its letter to the bank that the bank would be subject to criminal prosecution if it did so.

The declaration by the head of the bank's legal department that we submitted here states that this is not an empty threat, and the bank is seriously concerned about those possibilities.

dilemma. While the government has used the treaty for suppression of terrorism financing, that's not a treaty that is necessarily relevant in this case. We don't know what the Saudi government's handling of that treaty has been. The bank is privately owned. And it's not connected in any way to the Saudi government. But the reading -- the plain reading of that treaty and the government looked at the allegations and accounts in this indictment, they don't clearly involve financing terrorism. And, therefore, Saudi Arabia could reasonably have determined that this was not the appropriate mechanism to request these documents.

The bank has suggested many other options to try to work with the Saudi regulator to obtain permission to provide the records. It asked the government for additional details regarding the previous requests. And those requests by us to the government

were declined.

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The bank also suggested that if the government has copies of these records or some of the records which may not be admissible at trial, the bank offered to see whether it could certify those records rather than provide its own records as a way to avoid being the one providing the information. That was another suggestion that the bank provided that the government didn't take us up on.

What the government has not done is issue a letter rogatory in this case. And the government has known for almost four months that that is the process that the bank's regulators have decided is the appropriate mechanism. The bank has offered to try to get such a letter rogatory expedited so that it can get the approval to provide the documents, but the government has refused to do so. And possibly this is a strategic decision by the Office of International Affairs regarding how to deal with the coverage of the treaty, but it leaves the bank hostage to the U.S. authorities being very stubborn on this specific issue.

While the government brings the issue of the bank agreeing to be subject to this possible conflict between Saudi Arabian law and U.S. law, the balancing act required under restatement only comes into play if

the subpoena is enforceable, and we argue that the subpoena is not enforceable.

To begin with, we have the issue of the Fourth Amendment and a subpoena which is essentially self-enforcing. The fact that we are here today doesn't negate the Fourth Amendment issue. This is the classic instance of a situation that is -- can be -- can evade review but is subject to repetition because the only option for a bank receiving a subpoena is to go ahead and seek judicial review. There is no way for the bank to sit back and wait for the government to enforce the subpoena, because that's not required under the statute, which sets it apart from every other administrative subpoena statute.

Additionally, under Sherar v. Cullen, the bank should have that right to wait for the government to go ahead and seek enforcement of the subpoena. And it having to go ahead and seek judicial protection doesn't solve the constitutional issue here.

The government has tried to compare the search here to the search in *United States versus**Verdugo-Urquidez. Those are very different situations.

The search here is not entirely in Saudi Arabia. It was issued based on the bank's connections to the United States, the enforcement power is here in the United

States, and it requires the bank to bring the documents to Medford, Oregon, which is -- I would say -- pretty much quintessential American.

THE COURT: Yeah, they have electricity there now.

MR. GREEN: So we hear back in D.C. We barely have any there right now.

The government has also said the fact that the defendant in Verdugo-Urquidez was in the United States,
Justice Rehnquist made it very clear that that wasn't an issue there because he had been brought to the United
States against his will, and, therefore, hadn't
affirmatively brought himself to the United States and sought the protection. That's very different from a bank that has been keeping correspondent accounts in the United States for at least ten years, if not longer.

Even if the statute is constitutional, this is clearly a misuse of administrative subpoena power. It is black letter law that grand jury subpoenas may not be used to gather evidence for trial. And there are many cases that compare grand jury subpoenas to administrative subpoenas starting with U.S. v. Morton Salt which makes that comparison, and is one of the seminal cases regarding enforcement of administrative subpoenas.

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And since the government has argued Congress has deemed to be aware of the law regarding use of administrative subpoena, Congress would also have been aware of RTC v. Grant Thornton which makes it very clear that administrative subpoenas cannot be used to gather evidence for trial, and that doing so would upend traditional notions of investigations.

The cases that the government has cited to support its conclusions are not D.C. Circuit cases and are not Ninth Circuit cases. *U.S. v. Phibbs* is actually a case that *RTC v. Grant Thornton* cited to support its conclusion there. I would submit that that means that the holding in *U.S. v. Phibbs* is open to interpretation.

U.S. v. Harrington doesn't include a lot of
discussion, but it also doesn't cite ongoing
investigations.

And *U.S. v. Lazar*, which is the unpublished case from '09 that the government cited setting out the rule in the Sixth Circuit, also makes clear that that rule is a departure from traditional notions of use of administrative subpoenas.

Therefore, if Congress really wanted to provide the Department of Justice and the Department of Treasury to use these subpoenas in a way that is in opposition to the established rules regarding administrative

subpoenas, it would have been explicit in that.

Administrative agencies are creatures of statute. They have the powers that are granted to them by statute.

And this statute does not explicitly grant the power to use these subpoenas to gather evidence for trial. They are purely investigative.

The government does not dispute that the records are sought to gather evidence for trial. And at this stage in the proceeding, it would be difficult to believe that there is any ongoing investigation of any additional wrongdoing. And the government may actually use grand jury subpoenas in cases where there are continuing investigations into ongoing or other violations of the law that are not already in the indictment.

Additionally, in terms of the scope of the subpoena, the subpoena requests documents that all relate to an individual's private account at the bank. The statute -- the clear language of the statute speaks to relating to the correspondent account, and to request the universe of documents requested in this subpoena reads the words "relating to" out of the statute, and that's clearly an improper way to read the statute.

If the statute is constitutional and this is a

proper use for an administrative subpoena and if this is a subpoena that asks for the kinds of documents that are requested, that are allowed under the statute, the government -- the court still has to conduct a balancing test under the restatement of foreign relations. And we submit that in this case, the balance of the interests lies with quashing the subpoena rather than enforcing it.

The need for the documents is questionable given the fact that the government, as stated in Special Agent Anderson's declaration, already knows that the funds made their way to Saudi Arabia, were deposited at the bank, and that the bank had then worked with its correspondent accounts to negotiate these instruments.

The hardship on the bank if it complied with the subpoena is clear. It would be subject to criminal prosecution. And that is clearly a significant hardship under all the cases reading this -- the restatement balancing test. And in terms of the balance of interests, the government does speak broadly about its ability to conduct investigations into money laundering and financing of terrorism, but in this case it's about seeking some additional evidence to prove a point that we submit could already be proven with records that the government already has or records they can easily get

from the U.S. banks.

The Saudi interest here is making sure that the banks that it regulates don't work with international powers without going through the bank's own regulators. It would be very difficult for Saudi authorities to regulate their own banks if these banks are subject to demands from foreign authorities without involvement of the local authorities.

Saudi Arabia has not refused these documents. There are other options for the government to obtain the documents. We pointed out that a letter rogatory is what the Saudis already themselves had asked for as opposed to cases the government cites where the recipient of the subpoena suggested without showing that that was a method that would have worked. And it's unclear that enforcing the subpoena, if it led to closure of the bank's correspondent accounts, would — that, in fact, would foreclose the ability of the government to obtain these documents. And that is one of the balancing issues that are brought up in Richmark. And we believe here would militate to quash the subpoena rather than enforce it.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Gorder.

MR. GORDER: Your Honor, just briefly. I think the issue is joined before you.

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Just a couple of points I want to make.
can't accept that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would say
that this is not a terrorism case when they shut down
al-Haramain because of its terrorist connections.
clearly what the case is about.
         Second, I just don't read the Sherar versus
Cullen case that counsel cites to stand for the
proposition that providing the bank the option to file a
motion to quash somehow doesn't make this statute
constitutional. I just don't read that in that case.
         So we would request that you enforce the
subpoena.
         Your Honor, as you know, this is a case of
first impression, I don't want to delay your decision,
but I do believe this is one that, you know, lawyers
throughout the country will want to read your reasoning.
         MR. WAX: Your Honor?
         THE COURT: You have an interest here, too,
Mr. Wax.
         MR. WAX: We do.
         THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
         MR. WAX:
                   Thank you. We urge the court to view
this request by the government in the context of our
requests. It's an unusual situation which both the
defense and the government are seeking records from
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overseas. And we urge you in looking at our Saudi request, reconsidering our Egyptian request to do so in the context of the government's request.

The second comment I would make is that the use by the government and its citation to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism reinforces the point that we've attempted to make about the power that the government has, and the fact that it should not be permitted to use its powers, although in this instance not so far successfully, without balancing the playing field.

Third point, with respect to terrorism, in the year 2000, when the money that the government alleges went to Chechnya, the fight in Chechnya was not one viewed by the world or by the United States of America specifically as a terrorist action. It was rather a war of liberation or resistance to Russian aggression. And we've previously mentioned that the current vice president --

THE COURT: When were the school children assassinated?

MR. WAX: I don't recall the answer to that question, Your Honor, but there is absolutely no suggestion that we have seen in this case that the government has any notion that the money which we assert

was used to buy, if you will, blankets and food for widows and orphans was used for any specific terrorism offense. And the reality of the world's view of what was happening in Chechnya in 2000 takes us outside of any funding of terrorism.

The country that wanted to be the country of Chechnya, or perhaps was, was engaged in a war with the Soviet Union that was the Second Chechen War. Joe Biden, Vice President, then Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State, and other United States officials have described the war in that way.

So I think that with respect to any terrorism issue that exists between the United States and the bank, this is outside of that purview.

The next point that I would make, to the extent that you were concerned about the lateness of our request for Mr. El-Fiki, what you heard from the government is they proceeded in an informal way. We proceeded in an informal way. They were stymied. We were stymied. After they were stymied, they turned to the court. After we were stymied, we turned to the court. So I think that as you are considering the timing of our actions, the context again, the playing field should be even.

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Next point, the government and the court, in looking at the El-Fiki matter raised some questions about the relevance of the El-Fiki information we were seeking. I would submit that there is a significant question about the relevance of the information the government is seeking.

If what we're seeking with respect to El-Fiki is not relevant, then we fail to see how this is relevant.

To the extent that Mr. Sedaghaty had any control over the funds, his intent, his purpose was to do something humanitarian. If, after the money went to Saudi Arabia, other people acting independently of him did, as the government suggests, something different, irrelevant to his state of mind and the charges in this indictment.

So while we believe that El-Fiki is relevant, based on what you've already said, it seems this is equally as irrelevant or, perhaps, equally as relevant.

Finally, the bank suggests the government may already have these records. We believe the government is already in possession of the records. Whether or not these United States Attorneys have them in their possession may be a different question. And I think that that would require the court or behoove the court

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to inquire further into those matters. And that may
involve having classified sessions under the CIPA.
Thank you.
         THE COURT: What about the last suggestion?
         MR. GORDER: Excuse me, Your Honor?
         THE COURT: What about the last suggestion?
         MR. GORDER: Your Honor, if we had records that
we could --
         THE COURT: It's just one of the first times
that Mr. Wax has suggested I meet with the other side
alone. I've known him a long time, too.
         MR. GORDER: Your Honor, we'd be happy to meet
with you alone, if that's what you desire.
         If we had records that we could use in court at
the trial, we wouldn't have gone through this process.
But I'll leave to the court the decision of whether
Mr. Wax is supporting the government's motion or
opposing it because I'm not sure which. I will just
say, the government tried a very formal diplomatic
request in the summer of 2008 that failed, so we haven't
been sitting around twiddling our thumbs.
         THE COURT: I know whose side you are on.
That's all right.
         MR. WAX: I would point out to you that I found
Mr. Gorder's phrasing very, very interesting. If we had
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1 records --2 THE COURT: I listened, Mr. Wax. MR. WAX: -- that we could use in court, you 3 know, that doesn't say he doesn't have the records. 4 THE COURT: I listened. That's all right. 5 Ι don't have my hearing aids on, but I'd tell you to 6 7 repeat if I didn't hear. 8 MR. WAX: Thank you. Sorry. THE COURT: Okay. You had a couple of other 9 10 things to raise. 11 MR. WAX: Yes, briefly, Your Honor. We have --12 the court issued an order with respect to discovery that 13 included grand jury matters last week. Mr. Matasar and 14 Mr. Cardani engaged in some discussion about the fact that we don't yet have the grand jury testimony of 15 Ms. Anderson. We believe that it is relevant to us now. 16 17 We believe that it may contain information that would be instructive in the framing of a motion to dismiss, and 18 19 as well as trial preparation, and it was ordered more 20 than six months ago, and we'd request the court direct 21 the government to provide it to us forthwith. 22 You also still have pending before you two 23 motions for bills of particular. As our trial 24 preparation work is heating up and as we're looking 2.5 forward to the mid-March date for provision of witness

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and exhibit lists, it becomes more and more critical for
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    us to get rulings on those motions, and hope that you
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    can get to them in the near future. That's it.
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    you.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
             MR. CARDANI: No, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Thank you all very much.
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             (The proceedings were concluded at 12:45 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

I, Deborah Wilhelm, Certified Shorthand Reporter for the State of Oregon, do hereby certify that I was present at and reported in machine shorthand the oral proceedings had in the above-entitled matter. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my skill and ability, dated this 17th day of February, 2010.

/s/ Deborah Wilhelm
Deborah Wilhelm, RPR
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Certificate No. 00-0363